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Abstract In a recent paper, Levy, Gadd, Kerridge,
and Komesaroff attempt to defend the ethicality of
homeopathy by attacking the utilitarian ethical
framework as a basis for medical ethics and by
introducing a distinction between evidence-based
medicine and modern science. This paper demon-
strates that their argumentation is not only insuffi-
cient to achieve that goal but also incorrect.
Utilitarianism is not required to show that homeo-
pathic practice is unethical; indeed, any normative
basis of medical ethics will make it unethical, as a
defence of homeopathic practice requires the rejection
of modern natural sciences, which are an integral part of
medical ethics systems. This paper also points out that
evidence-based medicine lies at the very core of modern
science. Particular arguments made by Levy et al. within
the principlist medical ethics normative system are also
shown to be wrong.
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In their article on the ethics of homeopathy, Levy, Gadd,
Kerridge, and Komesaroff (Levy et al. 2015) attempt to
defend the indefensible by attacking utilitarian-based
medical ethics and by casting doubt on the evidence-
based medicine (EBM) paradigm of medical sciences.
In our reading, even if their reasoning were sound, it
would still be insufficient to defend homeopathy; how-
ever, in what follows we also will provide arguments
against the reasoning itself. We argue that not only is
their critique of utilitarianism wrong but also that any
form of a theoretical framework for medical ethics sup-
ports the view that homeopathic practice is unethical,
unless strong reasons are given for the exceptional status
of homeopathy. Moreover, the critique of EBM provid-
ed in the article is misleading and mistaken, as it would
only be valid if there was an actual distinction between
modern science and EBM. We conclude that one must
reject modern science or reject the ethicality of
homeopathy.
In their critique of utilitarian calculus applied to
homeopathy, Levy et al. (2015) try to compare various
utilities and disutilities of homeopathy. In this way, they
treat homeopathy on a par with evidence-based forms of
treatment. This, however, would require a comparison
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of medical intervention A versus intervention B. Levy
et al. (2015) do not do this, nor could they do this.
Homeopathy, with its proposed mechanisms of action,1
violates the laws of physics and current knowledge in
pharmacology, biochemistry, and pathophysiology
(House of Commons Science and Technology
Committee 2010; Novella 2011; Park 1997). Attempts
to prove its efficacy for any condition in clinical science
have so far failed (House of Commons Science and
Technology Committee 2010; NHMRC 2015). As such,
it is not part of established medical practice, and despite
it being practised and even funded as medicine, it has
the same methodological status as the practice of blood-
letting for humoral imbalance in the Middle Ages. Since
homeopathy flouts the methodological assumptions of
science—and one of the fundamental ethical principles
of medicine is to provide the best available care, which
in modern medicine means care based on the best avail-
able scientific knowledge—in order to ethically justify
the use of homeopathy by physicians, one would have to
exempt homeopathy from medical ethics.
In order to create the impression that homeopathy is
somehow a part of current medical practice, the authors
try to distance the concept of EBM both from science in
general and from medical practice. According to Levy
et al., the standards of EBM need to be relaxed in favour
of a Bmore sophisticated^ approach (2015, 207). Indeed,
within the philosophy of medicine, there are debates on
EBM and its standards of evidence and on ways of
translating probabilistic knowledge of populations into
actual medical practice that concerns individual patients
(e.g., Howick 2011). Another area of discussion is
whether a basic plausibility condition should be added
to eliminate redundant randomized controlled trials
(RCTs) on implausible treatment modalities that are
currently practised without an evidence base (Gorski
and Novella 2014a, 2014b). Such discussions are con-
cerned with intervention and pathophysiological data
that have been arrived at by moving up the EBM’s
pyramid of knowledge from basic science through case
studies to critical reviews and meta-analyses. However,
the issue with homeopathy is not that it is not feasible to
organize an RCTor that there are factors that are hard to
control for and therefore it is unknown for which
members of the population a particular intervention is
efficacious. The problem with homeopathy is that it has
never been established as efficacious even in laboratory
models. Moreover, such proof is highly implausible2
due to the fact that homeopathy contradicts the well-
established knowledge of the functioning of living or-
ganisms and their biochemistry. Still, regardless of its
physiological implausibility, homeopathy has been test-
ed in patient populations and never been proven to be
efficacious (House of Commons Science and
Technology Committee 2010; NHMRC 2015).
Therefore, in order for their argument to be valid,
Levy et al. (2015) would have to show how homeopathy
can be included in medical science. Obviously, they
have not done this.
Levy et al. (2015) present a simplified early
Popperian approach to scientific evidence: they present
the view (by all means logically correct) that lack of
evidence is not evidence of a lack. It is Popper, with his
falsificationism, who presented the view according to
which scientific theory can only be disproven (falsified),
but it can never be proven in a positive way (Popper
2002; Thornton 2014). However, even Popper defended
the ability of science to give positive results thanks to
corroboration and probability (Thornton 2014).
Popper’s stance was criticized almost immediately, by
showing that such an approach treats scientific and
pseudoscientific theories equally bymaking them equal-
ly improbable and systematically detached from facts
(Lakatos 1978; Kuhn 1996). This is due to the fact that
falsificationism only concerns the inner logic of theory
(until it is falsified, it is true, at least in part). Although
Kuhn (1981) partially agreed with Popper’s idea, he
stated that in everyday inquiry scientists need the pre-
mises established by the current scientific theory.
Lakatos (1981), on the other hand, proposed an ap-
proach of falsifying whole groups of theories, or
Bresearch programs,^ as he called them. Otherwise, the
theory would be judged independently from facts
(Lakatos 1981). This is because judging each theory
independently from all other theories would require
suspending any kind of correspondence between
1 Homeopathic theory was laid out by Hahnemann (1849). See
also the British Homeopathic Association (n.d.). The House of
Commons Science and Technology Committee (2010) and the
National Health and Medical Research Council (2015) also pro-
vide introductions to homeopathic concepts.
2 We do not claim that there is absolute logical impossibility of
homeopathy working, but such a situation would require a revo-
lutionary change in a prevailing majority of areas of science, a
whole new scientific paradigm. The evidence requiring such
change is simply not there, and we find it unlikely for it to be
found. We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for
pointing this out.
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them—relating one theory to another in order to confirm
or falsify the first one is not a possibility for Popper.
Modern approaches to scientific methodology tend to
include all possible factors that might affect the outcome
of scientific research (Latour 1987). A controversy in
scientific inquiry should only be opened if there are
serious doubts over issues critical for that particular
controversy. Logically, if something contradicts a more
basic theory, it automatically contradicts all claims of a
higher level. Homeopathy contradicts almost everything
we know about physics; therefore, it contradicts all
theories based upon it (i.e., biology, chemistry, etc.).
The scientific controversy around homeopathy should
not be reopened, as no arguments showing a lack of
contradiction between homeopathy and the natural sci-
ences have been put forward. The proponents of home-
opathy would have to provide an alternative to the
current paradigm of the natural sciences, one that would
provide explanations at least equally warranted to those
current science offers and an explanation of the mecha-
nism of homeopathic remedies. If one wishes to remain
within the current paradigm of the natural sciences, one
cannot promote homeopathy. On the other hand, if one
wishes to support homeopathy and remain scientific,
one should provide arguments demonstrating how ho-
meopathy is consistent with science.
Levy et al. demand a Bmore sophisticated approach to
evidence in medicine^ (2015, 207, emphasis original),
but they do not offer any kind ofmethodology outside of
EBM that would constitute a basis for the scientific
support of homeopathy.3 Probably this is because
EBM stems from the very core of science and scientific
methodology. EBM follows the rule of the best possible
evidence (Vos, Willems, and Houtepen 2004) and has
even adopted falsificationism in its practice by including
the idea of the permanent questionability of each treat-
ment. EBM also acknowledges (in certain aspects) the
idea of science being a social construct, subjected to
political influence (Djulbegovic, Guyatt, and Ashcroft
2009; Rada, Ratima, and Howden-Chapman 1999).
EBM is consistent with the natural sciences and follows
the results of basic research, as it does not pretend to
create any new scientific theories. It instead applies
science to clinical practice and to tests of therapies
(Djulbegovic, Guyatt, and Ashcroft 2009). Therefore,
if something is placed outside of EBM, it is also placed
outside of science (or, rather, the natural sciences). Of
course, for example, the sociological research on med-
ical treatments or our philosophical meta-reflections in
this paper also might be considered scientific. However,
they differ in conditions of acceptance of the hypothesis
and cannot be directly compared to examination of
medical treatments or to the natural sciences in general.
With these arguments, it is clearly evident that homeop-
athy can be promoted only from outside of science, not
by requesting changes within scientific methodology.
If medical science is translated by the theoretical
framework of EBM into recommendations for medical
practice according to a set of values and goals, then the
ethical situation of homeopathy should be seen as either
(1) a form of practice that contradicts current knowledge
and standards, and yet can be seen as part of medicine,
or (2) a form of non-medical practice that is nevertheless
offered as part of medicine.
If homeopathy is a form of medical practice (a form
of practice that should be included in medicine), we can
judge it using the same standards we would apply to any
other form of medical practice. Common approaches to
medical ethics, regardless of their theoretical justifica-
tion, require that practitioners apply the best available
knowledge to achieve the goals of their actions. In this
case, we have two options:
1. Homeopathic practitioners do not possess current
scientific knowledge that provides the foundations
for medicine—it follows that they are unfit to prac-
tise as physicians due to their lack of prerequisite
knowledge.
2. Homeopathic practitioners do possess current scien-
tific knowledge that provides the foundations for
medicine but choose not to follow it—in which case
they are in violation of the commonly accepted
principles of medical practice.
In both cases, the practice of homeopathy by physi-
cians is unethical because it violates the principle of
medical practice according to the best available knowl-
edge, which in today’s medicine is provided by science.
If, on the other hand, homeopathy is a form of non-
medical practice, but is offered in a medical setting, then
it is based on mass deception. All major ethical systems
provide strong arguments against large-scale deception.
Both Kantian and utilitarian arguments are in this case
3 We reject the possibility of proof outside of EBM—as it is a
paradigm designed so comprehensively that it allows one to pick
out potential positive effects coming from incomprehensible
mechanisms.
Bioethical Inquiry (2016) 13:21–25 23
quite compelling. Indeed, in cases of gravely ill patients,
the use of homeopathic remedies instead of effective
treatments would be one of the emblematic exam-
ples of harm caused by deception in a medical setting,
which could be avoided, if the patients were not de-
ceived into thinking that they were actually receiving a
medical intervention.
At the current stage of science, the claims of the
supporters of homeopathic practices contradict the
ethics of medicine. In view of the ethical principles of
medicine, according to which physicians should
practise according to the best available knowledge,
those who practise homeopathy must violate the ethics
of their profession or the general ethical rule against
systematic deception.
It should be clear by now that there is no need to
assume any specific normative theory for medical ethics
to demonstrate that homeopathy is deeply unethical.
However, some of the more specific points made by
Levy et al. (2015) should be addressed, as their paper
mentions some key notions of the principlist framework
in which medical ethics is usually analysed. They argue
that opposition to homeopathy is paternalistic and
against the autonomy of patients who choose homeop-
athy. This is a misconstruction of autonomy. An auton-
omous decision, as typically understood in medical
ethics, requires: intentionality, understanding, and vol-
untariness (Faden and Beauchamp 1986; Beauchamp
and Childress 2012). It is not the aim of this critique to
present these three issues at length. It is sufficient to say
that the condition of understanding requires disclosure
that includes the provision of information on efficacy
and risk. In the case of homeopathy, such information
would have to include information about the lack of
scientific evidence of therapeutic efficacy and the lack
of rigorous studies concerning the risk of homeopathy as
compared to therapies based on biomedical science. One
could speak of a patient’s autonomous choice only
if, having been provided with this kind of infor-
mation, he or she still opted for homeopathy. This,
however, would not change the fact that a practitioner
who practised homeopathy would nevertheless be vio-
lating the ethical principle of treatment according to the
best available knowledge.
Similarly, principles of beneficence and non-malefi-
cence, regardless of their theoretical justification, are
violated (as illustrated above) by either incompetence
or deception. The requirement of justice is often violated
by these practices on multiple levels as well. The most
blatant example is the funding of homeopathy within a
public healthcare system whose limited resources could
be used to provide effective treatments for the sick.
Similarly, in the private medical sector, the use of ho-
meopathy means diverting individual resources from
potentially life-saving treatments to methods with-
out proven efficacy. In both cases, resources are
spent on practices without proven efficacy, and
time is wasted that could be used on therapies with
known efficacy and risks. According to World Health
Organization (2009) estimates, in the United Kingdom
alone this amounted to US$62 million spent on home-
opathy in 2007. In the United States, the same report
(WHO 2009) estimated the expenditure at US$2.9 bil-
lion, whilst healthcare financing has been in increasing-
ly grave crisis worldwide.
In conclusion, the only possible defence of the ethi-
cality of homeopathic practices is a wholesale rejection
of modern science. Demands to relax the standards of
evaluation of evidence in order to incorporate the pre-
scientific theory of Hahnemann (1849) into medicine
are tantamount to demands for special treatment. Levy
et al. (2015) did not give reasons for such special treat-
ment, nor could they do so. Science, logic, and ethics
require that homeopathy be removed from the practice
of medicine and relegated to the history of medicine.
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